WAFU Short Interest
Wah Fu Education Group Limited (WAFU) operates in the Consumer Defensive sector, specifically the Education & Training Services industry, with a market capitalization near $6.1M, listed on NASDAQ, employing roughly 105 people, carrying a beta of 1.05 to the broader market. Wah Fu Education Group Limited, founded in 1999 and headquartered in Beijing, People's Republic of China, specializes in delivering online educational solutions within China, focusing primarily on digital examination preparation and associated technological services. Led by Yang Yu, public since 2019-04-30.
Short interest is the total number of shares currently sold short and not yet covered, reported bi-monthly by FINRA. Days to cover (short interest divided by average daily volume) indicates how long it would take short sellers to close positions, with higher values signaling greater squeeze potential.
- Settlement Date
- 2026-08-14
- Short Interest
- 181.8K
- Previous Short Interest
- 6.3K
- Change
- 2769.62%
- Days to Cover
- 1.00
- Avg Daily Volume
- 5.4M
- Avg Days to Cover (24 reports)
- 1.18
Showing 24 bi-monthly FINRA short interest reports for Wah Fu Education Group Limited.
Learn how short interest is reported and how to read the data →
Frequently asked WAFU short interest questions
- What is the current WAFU short interest?
- As of the Aug 14, 2026 settlement, Wah Fu Education Group Limited (WAFU) short interest is 181.8K shares, a +2769.62% change from the prior period. FINRA publishes short interest twice monthly on the 15th and last business day of each month under Rule 4560.
- What is the WAFU days-to-cover ratio?
- Days-to-cover is 1.00, calculated as short interest divided by average daily volume. It estimates how many trading days closing all short positions would consume given typical liquidity. Values above 5 days are commonly cited as elevated; values above 10 days are squeeze-relevant.
- How does WAFU short interest affect options pricing?
- High short interest changes options pricing through three mechanics: borrow-rebate effects (synthetic long stock trades below frictionless put-call parity by approximately the borrow rebate when shares are hard-to-borrow), gamma-squeeze setup risk (if dealers are short gamma against retail call buying, dealer hedge flow can amplify upward moves), and elevated event-vol pricing on names with squeeze potential. See the canonical short-interest documentation for the full mechanism.